Collazo v. Prime Flight of DE, Inc.: The DNJ Rules That Explicit Jury Waivers Are Not Needed To Enforce Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context

Collazo v. Prime Flight of DE, Inc.: The DNJ Rules That Explicit Jury Waivers Are Not Needed To Enforce Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context

By Punam Alam, Esq., on August 19, 2020

Continuing its pro-arbitration trend, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently enforced an arbitration clause which did not contain language expressly indicating that the employee was waiving her right to a jury trial.  See Collazo v. Prime Flight of DE, Inc., 19-cv-21314(KM) (D.N.J. July 13, 2020) (Judge McNulty).  In so doing, the Court relied on Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services, a New Jersey Supreme Court decision many have interpreted as requiring the inclusion of the aforementioned language to render an arbitration clause enforceable. 219 N.J. 430, 447 (2014)(stating that the arbitration clause “at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that the plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute.”).  Specifically, the District Court of New Jersey granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration of claims brought by a former employee under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601.

The arbitration clause at issue in Collazo stated that the employee was waiving the right to bring a lawsuit in court, but omitted language stating she was waiving the right to a jury trial. The former employee argued that the ruling in Atalese rendered the arbitration clause invalid because of the omission.  In rejecting this argument, the Court distinguished the arbitration agreement at issue in Atalese involving a commercial contract from the employment context in this case finding that a contract in the employment context “pertains to a major life decision; a person would naturally give it more attention than, say, the fine print in a car rental contract.”  While holding that the arbitration clause was enforceable despite the lack of explicit language that the employee was waiving the right to a jury trial, the Court, relying on Atalese, noted that there are no particular words that are required in an arbitration clause, instead, the arbitration clause “must clearly convey the concept that the plaintiff ‘is choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court of law.’” In this case, the Court found that the arbitration clause made clear that the employee was giving up her right to sue in court and that she was required to pursue employment-related claims through arbitration.

Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Collazo, employers should continue to include a clear jury waiver in arbitration agreements and scrutinize the language used therein given the evolving case law surrounding the enforceability of arbitration clauses.

The case is Collazo v. Prime Flight of DE, Inc., 19-cv-21314(KM) (D.N.J. July 13, 2020).

SIGN UP

SIGN UP NOW to receive time sensitive employment law alerts and invitations to complimentary informational webinars and seminars.

"*" indicates required fields

By clicking this button and submitting information to us, you will be submitting certain personally identifiable information, or information which used together with other information, can be used to identify you and/or identify information about you, to Nukk-Freeman & Cerra, PC (“NFC”). Such information may be used by NFC to contact or identify you. Personally identifiable information may include, but is not limited to, your [name, phone number, address and/or] email address. We collect this information for the purpose of providing services, identifying and communicating with you, responding to your requests/inquiries, and improving our services. We may use your personally identifiable Information to contact you with time sensitive employment law e-alerts, marketing or promotional offers, invitations to complimentary and informational webinars and seminars, and other information that may be of interest to you. However, by providing any of the foregoing information to you, we are not creating an attorney-client relationship between you and NFC: nor are we providing legal advice to you. You may opt out of receiving any, or all, of these communications from us by following the unsubscribe link in any email we send. However, this will not unsubscribe you from receiving future communications from us which are based upon an independent request, relationship or act by you.