Does the ADA Require Accommodation for Workers Who Can Still Perform the Job Without It? – The Second Circuit says . . .

Possibly.  On March 25, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District holding that “accommodations that are not strictly necessary for an employee’s performance of essential job functions may still be reasonable and therefore required by the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)].”  The Second Circuit joins several other federal appeals courts that have reached the same conclusion, including the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals.  Here’s what you need to know.

Background

Plaintiff Angel Tudor, a teacher in the Whitehall Central School District, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and requested an accommodation to manage her symptoms.  In 2008, Tudor requested and received an accommodation from Whitehall allowing her to take a 15-minute break during each of her morning and afternoon “prep periods” when she was not responsible for overseeing students. 

After a 2016 policy change prohibited teachers from leaving school grounds during prep periods, Tudor was only permitted to take her morning break and, occasionally, an afternoon break if coverage was available.  This continued until 2019 when no Whitehall employee was available to cover Tudor during the afternoon breaks.  However, Tudor continued to take unauthorized afternoon breaks in violation of school policy, which exacerbated her anxiety.

Thereafter, Tudor sued Whitehall in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York alleging failure to accommodate under the ADA.  During the proceedings, Tudor acknowledged that she was able to “perform the essential functions of her job” without an accommodation, albeit “under great duress and harm.”  Based on this admission, the district court granted summary judgment to Whitehall finding that Tudor failed to establish “‘the third element of her failure to accommodate claim,’ i.e., that ‘with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue.’”

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision ruling that “an employee may qualify for a reasonable accommodation even if she can perform the essential functions of her job without the accommodation.”  In other words, an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of the job without an accommodation does not foreclose their failure-to-accommodate claim.

Analysis

The Second Circuit based its decision on its interpretation of two provisions of the ADA:

  • The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  (Emphasis in original.) 
  • The ADA prohibits “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee,” unless “the accommodation would impose an undue hardship” on the employer. 

Considering the two provisions together, the court found that – absent undue hardship – an employer must “offer a reasonable accommodation . . . to an employee with a disability if that employee is capable of performing the essential functions of her job with or without the accommodation.”  The court emphasized that just because “an employee can perform her job responsibilities without a reasonable accommodation does not mean that she must: she may be a ‘qualified individual’ entitled to reasonable accommodation even if she can perform the essential functions of her job without one.” 

The court further noted that, as a remedial statute, the ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose and “[t]o say that an accommodation must be strictly necessary to be reasonable would run counter to the purpose.”  However, the court did not “consider the extent to which the necessity of an accommodation . . . is relevant to any particular failure-to-accommodate claim[,]” instead holding only that “the necessity of the accommodation is not dispositive” and that “employees who can work without accommodation are included within the category of individuals ‘qualified’ for reasonable accommodations[.]”

The court noted that Whitehall may still raise other defenses on remand, including whether Tudor has a qualifying disability and what accommodation would be reasonable, and whether the requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship on Whitehall.  

Employer Takeaways

This decision makes clear that the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement is meant not only to allow an employee to perform the job, but also to support employee well-being and workplace inclusion.  This means that – in addition to providing accommodations that are strictly necessary to allow an employee to perform the essential functions of their job – employers may also be required to provide accommodations that mitigate an employee’s disability-related symptoms.  Accordingly, employers should reassess their accommodation policies to ensure they comport with this decision and comply with more protective state or local laws.


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