The Third Circuit Trails SCOTUS and Eliminates the Heightened Standard for Discrimination Claims by Majority Plaintiffs

At this point, it is likely that most (if not all) employment law specialists are familiar with SCOTUS’ landmark ruling in Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, which unanimously struck down the “Background Circumstances Rule” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).  The Background Circumstances Rule has historically imposed a heightened burden on plaintiffs who are not in minority groups to show that they were discriminated against by an “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” – a standard minority plaintiffs were not required to meet. In Ames, SCOTUS eliminated the additional burden for majority plaintiffs asserting Title VII claims remarking that Title VII “draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.”  For employers in New Jersey, this temporarily created differing standards for “reverse discrimination” claims under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). 

The Third Circuit Says “No More Background Circumstances in NJLAD Cases

For less than nine months, Ames governed only Title VII claims and did not extend to claims under the NJLAD.  This changed on March 6, 2026 with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, et al.        

In Massey, a Deputy Chief in Bergenfield’s Police Department sued the Borough of Bergenfield and five Councilmembers after he was denied a promotion in favor of an Arab-Muslim co-employee of a lower rank.  Plaintiff, a white male, asserted racial and religious discrimination claims in violation of the NJLAD and federal constitutional law.  The evidence revealed a number of race-related comments made by decisionmakers regarding the Borough’s promotion decision, including that Plaintiff “did not look like the people in town,” the importance of having a “minority department head,” that the other candidate was selected “because he’s a minority” and would bring “understanding of the diversified community” of Bergenfield, among others.

The Massey case, once again placed the Background Circumstances Rule at the center of judicial scrutiny – this time in connection with New Jersey state law.  The Third Circuit relied on three major reasons in reaching its conclusion: (1) while it lacked precedential guidance from the New Jersey Supreme Court, it was confident that the Supreme Court would likely follow Ames and conclude that the Background Circumstances Rule should not apply to cases under the NJLAD, especially considering that the pertinent text of Title VII and the NJLAD is identical; (2) Plaintiff met his burden of showing pretext under the McDonnell Douglas framework; and (3) there was ample evidence of direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination.

Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s NJLAD claim.

Key Takeaways

With this decision, the Third Circuit now imposes the same burden on all plaintiffs regardless of their membership in a majority group.  However, as employment lawyers, our advice remains the same  ̶ employers should treat all claims of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation equally and apply relevant policies uniformly and consistently.


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