A recent case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania presents an interesting example of how courts are interpreting the Supreme Court’s April 2024 decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which held that to succeed on a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff need only demonstrate some harm, not significant harm. For a more thorough analysis of the Muldrow decision, please see NFC’s previous blog entry here.
In Peifer v. Board of Probation and Parole, the plaintiff, Samantha Peifer, sued her employer, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, for pregnancy and disability discrimination under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). Peifer’s role as an alcohol and drugs agent required her to perform physical functions such as apprehending and restraining offenders.
In September 2019, Peifer was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In January 2020, she learned she was pregnant. In March 2020, Peifer requested “light duty” due to her pregnancy.
The Board denied Peifer’s request because, according to the Board, light duty was only available for employees who experienced a work-related injury. As a result, Peifer went out on a combination of unpaid FMLA leave and vacation time. After Peifer filed an EEOC charge alleging discrimination and retaliation based on sex, pregnancy, and disability, the Board reversed course and notified Peifer (without explanation for the change of heart) that it could accommodate her request for light duty. Upon her return to work, the Board reinstated Peifer’s leave time and reimbursed her lost salary.
Shortly after returning to work, Peifer requested another accommodation, seeking to either work from home or be provided with personal protective equipment (“PPE”) due to her high-risk pregnancy and potential exposure to COVID-19. The Board provided Peifer with PPE but declined her request to work from home based on the in-person responsibilities of her position. Peifer filed a second EEOC charge and subsequently resigned her position on September 23, 2020, alleging constructive discharge.
On December 13, 2021, Peifer filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On November 7, 2022, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow, the Board moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that the denial of Peifer’s accommodation requests – and the corresponding temporary loss of pay, benefits, and perks due to the leave she was forced to take – did not constitute “significant” harm.
Peifer appealed and, while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Muldrow. In light of that decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment with respect to Peifer’s claims of constructive discharge and discrimination and retaliation claims based on her request to work from home, but remanded to determine whether Peifer had shown “some” employment-related harm as to the claims based on the denial of her request for light duty.
On remand, on October 31, 2024, the District Court denied summary judgment as to the claims arising from Peifer’s request for light duty, finding that Peifer’s asserted harms – emotional stress, humiliation, fear of losing her job, use of FMLA leave, and loss of pay – met the “some harm” threshold established in Muldrow. The Court further found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an inference of unlawful discrimination could be drawn because Peifer presented evidence that she would have been accommodated if the request was based on a workplace injury or disability, rather than pregnancy.
This case represents a prime example of the impact of the revised standard under Muldrow. Employers should continue to consult with counsel as more courts apply the lowered standard in the wake of Muldrow.
Please contact an NFC team member if you have any questions or seek further assistance.