Third Circuit Clarifies the Duty to Accommodate is “Not a License to Speculate”

What happens when an employee first discloses a medical condition only after being confronted about workplace misconduct?

In Hileman v. West Penn Allegheny Health System Inc., No. 25-1459, 2026 WL 2083796 (3d Cir. July 20, 2026), the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a hospital employer, holding that an employee who did not disclose her disability until confronted about workplace misconduct, and who never requested an accommodation or medical leave, could not sustain her disability discrimination, retaliation, failure-to-accommodate, or medical-leave claims[1].  

The Court explained that although employers must respond when an employee communicates a need for accommodation or that need is apparent from known facts, the duty to accommodate “is not a license to speculate,” and employers “need not go digging for disabilities without a signal that one exists.”

Background

Approximately a year into her employment, Cheryl Hileman, a CAT scan technologist who worked the night shift at Forbes Hospital, was reprimanded for calling out of work too often. The reprimand form also advised her how to ask for a disability accommodation or medical leave, but she did not request either.

Five months later, a coworker reported concerns that Hileman was sleeping during her shift, texting while working, and failing to stock rooms. The hospital maintained a policy prohibiting employees from sleeping on duty or positioning themselves to sleep and warning that violations could result in termination. Hileman’s manager initiated an investigation. Hileman denied sleeping but admitted that she “might have shut [her] eyes” to alleviate dry eye caused by a change in her diabetes medication that was also causing fatigue.  That was Hileman’s first disclosure to the hospital that she had diabetes, despite having been diagnosed before her employment began.  She later emailed her manager that she was “praying” for improvement and adjusting her medication, but she did not ask for a disability accommodation or medical leave. Soon after, she was fired for misconduct.

Hileman sued, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and wrongful termination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), as well as interference with medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The District Court granted summary judgment to the hospital, concluding that Hileman was terminated for misconduct and had not requested an accommodation or medical leave. Hileman appealed.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit affirmed, and its reasoning was direct. To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA or PHRA, an employee must show that the employer knew she needed reasonable accommodation and failed to provide it. The employee does not need to use “magic words,” but she must communicate, directly or through other appropriate means, that she wants assistance because of a disability. Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318, 332 (3d Cir. 2003).

The Court also recognized an important limit on an employer’s duty to accommodate. When the need for accommodation is obvious from known facts, an employer may need to construe even a vague statement generously and follow up. But that was not the case here. Before the misconduct investigation, the hospital did not know that Hileman had diabetes, and her references to dry eye, fatigue, and medication changes did not make a disability-related accommodation need obvious. As the Court explained, employers cannot assume employees are disabled and need accommodations.

The Third Circuit then turned to the misconduct decision.  Even assuming Hileman’s statements could be read as an accommodation request, the ADA did not require the hospital to excuse misconduct that had already occurred. The Court also reiterated that neutral workplace rules remain enforceable in most circumstances, even if the employee later says the misconduct was caused by a disability.  Sleeping on duty violated the hospital’s policy, and Hileman did not present evidence that the stated reason for termination was pretextual. As the Court succinctly explained, disability-discrimination and medical-leave laws are “shields against discrimination, not get-out-of-discipline-free cards.”

Takeaways for Employers

Hileman offers several practical reminders for employers navigating medical disclosures during disciplinary proceedings.

First, a medical disclosure is not the same thing as a request for accommodation. If an employee shares a diagnosis or explains a medical reason for workplace conduct, that may warrant follow-up, but it does not automatically trigger an accommodation obligation.  

At the same time, employers should not ignore obvious signals. If the facts already known to the employer make a disability-related need for assistance apparent, the employer should follow up even if the employee does not use formal ADA language.  The key is what the employer actually knows.

The decision also confirms employers may continue to enforce neutral workplace rules.  An employee’s later medical disclosure does not erase misconduct that already occurred, and it does not prevent discipline supported by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.


[1] The Court also noted that it affirmed sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel for filing a motion containing misquotations and denied the request to supplement the record.


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